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Schouborg, Gary
(1997). "A Methodology for the Science of Consciousness". Karl
Jaspers Forum, Target Article 2, 17 July 1997. Online journal
A Methodology for the Science of Consciousness
Gary Schouborg
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[1] ABSTRACT: The Science of Consciousness (SOC) is continuous
with everyday thinking and with other scientific specialities in beginning
inevitably with the inquiring subject's own conscious experiencing. This does
not lead to solipsism, because the hypothesis of an independently existing
world is the best hypothesis to explain the facts of subjective experience.
SOC is unique among all ways of knowing in needing to be fully critical, not
simply as academic philosophy is by conceptualizing the structure of
conscious inquiry, but by being reflectively aware of consciousness as such,
the womb from which inquiry is born. Therefore, in SOC the scientist and the
philosopher merge. Initially, this reflective awareness means being open to
experiencing non-naturalistic as well as naturalistic claims, altered states
of consciousness as well as ordinary ones. It is an empirical issue, not to
be decided a priori by some empiricist commitment, whether such
non-naturalistic claims and altered states actually exist and what their
relevance is to understanding consciousness.
KEYWORDS: consciousness,
subjectivity, objectivity, epistemology, concentration, mindfulness, science,
altered states, empiricism, scientific methodology, non-empirical knowledge,
critique, pragmatic naturalism
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[2] This article began with the title, "A Methodology
for the 1st-Person Science of Consciousness." However, I soon realized
that the methodology I was formulating was no different from that used in
science generally. Whether inquiring into neural, behavioral, cognitive, or
social systems, or consciousness itself, scientists inevitably begin with
their personal experiencing (n 1) and make
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--------------
factual claims (n 2) (hereafter,
claims) about experience which have
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--------------
implications beyond it and which
are tested against certain constraints. Specific differences in perceptual
discrimination, conceptualization, and experimental manipulation arise as
inquiries become increasingly sophisticated and specialized. This article
therefore formulates a methodology for the science of consciousness
(hereafter, SOC) by first placing it within a general methodology of science
and then identifying the specialized skills and techniques required to
explore 1st-person consciousness or experiencing.
[3] The general argument is this. We must first distinguish
between our experiencing, our experience (what we are experiencing), and our
claims about it (knowledge)(n 3), so we can understand the
--------------
--------------
ground on which science builds.
Then we can see how science involves experiencing and knowing that are only
different in degree from our ordinary, daily experiencing and knowing. From
that perspective, we can flesh out the specific experiential (1st-person)
skills the inquirer into consciousness needs to generate and identify
relevant data, the specific conceptual skills needed to hypothesize about the
data, and the specific evaluation skills needed to test hypotheses. My aim is
to formulate a general framework sufficiently plausible and useful that a
critical mass of consciousness scientists will use it to move their inquiries
forward rather than endlessly debate fundamentals. In fact, a partially
explicit framework is already operating. My aim here is to render it more
explicit and to provide some support for its feasibility.
I. Experiencing, Experience,
and Knowledge
[4] Science, like the rest of our knowledge, begins with
experiencing (the conscious awareness of) something (experience), taken as
broadly as possible (n 4). Though this triadic formulation is
--------------
--------------
awkward compared to the
traditional one of stating simply that knowledge begins with experience, by
including experiencing it has the virtue of calling to our attention that
what is known is known through activity of the knowing subject. The
traditional formulation, on the other hand, lends itself to the objectivist
illusion that somehow we know things in a way that is unaffected by our
experiencing it, things as they are "already out there."
[5] Experience is therefore immediate; it is given in our experiencing.
However, it is not some fundamental given about which we cannot be mistaken
and upon which knowledge is built as upon an unshakable foundation. It is not
necessarily "pure" experience devoid of any claim. It is merely a
humble starting point. It may be as simple as a visual field completely
filled with undifferentiated redness, as complex as parents' feelings on the
birth of their first child, or as sophisticated as reading *The Waste Land*.
In other words, an experience may itself be composed of claims - for example,
my conscious belief that I am typing into a computer disk that exists
independently of me can itself be an experience, if by reflection I make it
an object of my awareness (as I am doing in the very act of writing this
sentence). 'Experience' is therefore not an absolute term, but is correlative
to 'experiencing.' It is also correlative to 'claim' insofar as it is that
about which a claim is made.
[6] *Knowledge* is sometimes predicated of experiencing,
sometimes of reports (in this article, 1st-person unless explicitly stated
otherwise) about experience, and sometimes of true claims (in this article,
3rd-person unless explicitly stated otherwise) based on experience. Thus, we
say we have known pain, meaning that we have experienced pain. Or we report
to others that we are experiencing pain, and we characterize the basis of our
report as privileged knowledge because only we can feel our own pain. Or we
claim that someone else is in pain, saying we know it from their (n 5)
behavior. The differences between these kinds of knowledge are crucial to
develop a valid and useful methodology for SOC.
------------
------------
[7] Consider my experiencing pain. I cannot be mistaken about
either the experiencing or the experience themselves, because they are simply
what they are; no claim is yet being made about them (n 6). Therefore, to say
that my experiencing is knowledge is simply to
------------
------------
equate the two words. Before I
can be mistaken, I must claim something, which I do only in a report or in a
3rd-person claim. I can *express* my pain by grimace, gesture, or word. And I
can do so untruthfully if I simulate being in pain when I'm not; or I can do
so ineptly, if I am an insufficiently skilled actor. But I cannot be mistaken
in my expression, since it is not a claim.
[8] Now consider my report to others that I am in pain. Like
experiencing, it exists in a 1st-person perspective; for I'm reporting on my
own experiencing. Like experiencing, it is privileged knowledge, since for
the same reason that no one else can have my pain, neither can they give a
report of my pain (n 7). Unlike
-----------
-----------
experiencing, however, and also
unlike an expression, my report can be false, since it is a claim
(1st-person) about a state of affairs - namely, that I am in pain. Unlike a
claim, a report is about an experience to which others in principle cannot
have access - that is, they cannot experience my pain. For that reason, a
report cannot be mistaken, except incidentally. Perhaps I think the correct
English word is 'rain' and tell you that I am in rain. Or, through a slip of
the tongue, I tell you that I am in Spain. And there are odd feelings I may
have which I am unsure whether to call painful or not. In all these cases, my
mistake is not about the experience itself, but only what to call it.
Finally, I can report a false memory - for example, that I had a toothache
last Monday. In that case, however, I'm not mistaken that I recall having a
toothache last Monday; that is simply my memory-experience. Rather, what is
mistaken is my 1st-person claim that is part of this particular memory that I
am experiencing. In short, my memory may be mistaken, but not my experiencing
of that memory.
[9] In contrast to experiencing and reports, *claims* go
beyond my experience to assert some state of affairs distinct from the
experience itself. For example, based on my experiencing you bent over,
grimacing, and groaning, I claim that you are experiencing pain. Or, based on
my feeling forced to move out of the way or of forcing other objects out of
the way, I claim that whenever anything moves, some force made it do so. It
is precisely this gap between experience and claims about it that allows
claims to be mistaken. From this perspective, the "hard" problem of
consciousness (Chalmers 1995, 1997) is first the *epistemological* one of
what justification there is for making (3rd-person) claims based on
(1st-person) experiencing. The *ontological* "hard" problem of how
conscious things (processes, events, agents, activities, functions, etc.)
emerge from unconscious things is a separate issue which this article will
not address.
II. Three Kinds of Claim
[10] *Naturalistic claims* (hereafter, claims) are, as already
indicated, about experience taken very broadly. The preceding section has
distinguished them from experiencing itself and reports about experience. *Non-naturalistic
claims* (hereafter, n-claims) are especially likely to be found in moral and
religious discourse. An example of a moral n-claim might be that killing is
wrong, where the predicate 'wrong' is not based on any experience (for
example, the unwanted consequences of killing), but on a uniquely moral
intuition. Similarly, an example of a religious n-claim might be that a
personal, loving God exists, an assertion not based on experience (for
example, motion or conditional existents, or some mystical union), but on a
uniquely religious, spiritual, or mystical insight or intuition. *Equivocal
claims* (hereafter, e-claims) are assertions whose meaning is unclear. An
example of an e-claim is that I dissolved into oneness with the universe
(hereafter, DO). Perhaps the e-claim is an assertion expressed poetically by
default, as the best I could do to express my experience. In that case, it
may be relatively easy to determine what was originally intended (I was aware
of nothing but being conscious; or, I felt no emotional distance between me
and the universe - it was a feeling of complete rapport). On the other hand,
the e-claim may not be primarily an assertion at all, but a purely poetic
expression of a particular experience. In this case, a report or claim may be
culled from the expression, not as if it were originally intended, but as a
report or claim that is consistent with it. Thus, in making the e-claim DO, I
may have been expressing a poetic intuition which brings together numerous
experiences and claims about which I am, as a poet, unconcernedly unaware. In
that case, it is meaningless to ask what I originally intended, though we
could argue certain claims are consistent with my poetic expression (that I
felt complete rapport with the universe is consistent with DO).
1. Naturalistic Claims
[11] A clear and correct understanding of two characteristics
of claims are critical for SOC: (1) they go beyond experience, yet (2) are
constrained by it. Thus, if I see a red apple, I go beyond that particular
experience by tying it through memory to other experiences and supposing that
the apple is of a particular structure that exists independently of me. What
is problematic is my going beyond the original perception at all. The
justification for doing so cannot be in terms of formal logic, since, by
definition, claims assert facts not entailed by experience itself. Nor will
appeals to inductive logic help, since the latter does not try to justify
going beyond experience as such, but at best only identifies constraints
within which doing so should occur. The justification is pragmatic: it works.
Yes, it is theoretically possible that my experience is the result of a
deceptive demon, but mankind has survived and in some ways progressed by
moving from experiences to claims about them that assume an independently
existing world. In addition, though theoretical alternatives to realism, such
as the deceptive demon, have been proposed, there are no verified instances
of anyone actually living and thinking according to their dictates.
[12] The second characteristic of claims that is critical to
understand in what sense they are constrained by experience, not by an
independently existing reality. Consider, for example, my conviction that
I am now seeing and feeling an apple that would continue to exist if I
dropped dead this second. Epistemologically, my experience of the
apple is given within my consciousness as a constraint on my claim.
That is, I experience the apple as something any claim must "match"
in order to be correct. This experience is composed of my current perception
combined through memory with a host of past experiences. It is to account for
and make use of this complex, subjective experience that I claim this apple
exists independently of me. Once I have accepted that claim of an
independently existing apple, I can argue ontologically that the apple
constrains my claim by causing those experiences in the first place. In
short, claims are constrained epistemologically by my experience and ontologically
by the causes of my experience.
2. Non-naturalistic Claims
[13] N-claims pose at least two problems for SOC,
epistemological and ontological. Epistemologically, since n-claims are
not claims about experience, they cannot be directly criticized by any
science that is about experience. For science as so defined can only pit one
claim about experience against another. Still, since those who make n-claims
are conscious of them, science can study them as another experience. In other
words, though science cannot epistemologically evaluate n-claims, it can
study their ontology. Thus, it might be able to establish
non-epistemological criteria for determining whether they are delusions,
wishful thinking, conjectures, knowledge, etc. Of course, it must be careful
not to argue circularly that n-claims are in some way pathological because
they are not based on experience. Instead, it must tie them, if possible, to
behavior assessed as pathological on independent grounds. For example, my
n-claim that I am Napoleon could be assessed as delusional, not because I
refuse to accept counter-evidence (for example, that Napoleon died a while
back), but because of the counter-evidence itself. In other words, the facts
about Napoleon indicate that I am at least mistaken, and further facts about
my behavior (and perhaps in the future, neural processes) indicate that I am
more than simply mistaken, but delusional. A really critical (in the Kantian
sense) SOC will be careful to articulate just what assumptions help create
that evidence so as to avoid ethnocentric question-begging from the
perspective of ordinary consciousness.
3. Equivocal Claims
[14] E-claims pose problems for SOC similar to n-claims. Like
the latter, they exist in some people's minds and are therefore experiences
whose ontology can be studied by SOC. Epistemologically, they are more
complex than n-claims. Let's return to DO (my saying that I dissolved into
oneness with the universe). We can try to understand this as text and through
my own report. As text, we can look at the context in which DO exists: the
immediate context, through the more remote context of my Collected Sayings,
to the most remote context of my era and culture. We can compare its form
with other e-claims to see if perhaps we can determine if DO is poetic
expression only, a poetic expression with imbedded assertion, or an
out-and-out claim or n-claim. Using my own report, the SOC
investigator can ask me what I meant by DO. Perhaps I can straightforwardly
and less ambiguously express my original intention. For example, I might
report that when I said DO I was just expressing how I felt; or that I meant
that literally the universe and I were one; or that I meant that I felt a
wonderful rapport with everything while simultaneously being conscious of
being distinguishable from everything else. On the other hand, perhaps I
myself do not know what I meant and must join with the investigator in
treating DO as text for both of us to understand.
[15] Because of the unique fact that reflecting on consciousness
changes it, reports are peculiarly difficult to use as data. For example,
suppose the SOC researcher asks me what I meant by DO and I reply that I
meant the universe and I were literally one. Then the researcher , seeking
clarification, says, "By that, do you mean something different from
saying that you felt a wonderful rapport with the universe?" I might
reply that I didn't mean that at all. I might also reply, "Oh yes,
that's exactly what I meant!", in a way that makes it seem likely that the
researcher really helped me explain myself. But I might also agree with their
prodding in a way that raises the question of whether the researcher's
suggestion has just distorted the evidence. Clearly, getting me to clarify my
report in a way that does not alter the nature of the original report is a
tricky enterprise. Yet it seems equally clear that a conceptually
sophisticated subject might report their experience differently from a naive
one.
III. The Science of
Consciousness
[16] It seems generally accepted that, in rough outline, we
know how to make and test claims about mental activity. That is the
"easy" problem (Chalmers 1995, 1996, 1997), to which this article
contributes nothing except the perspective introduced above. Neither will it
address the ontological hard problem of how conscious mental activities
emerge from unconscious realities. Instead, I will spend the rest of the time
on the middle problem of phenomenology, by which I mean a study of the
structure of consciousness (conscious awareness), as opposed to the contents
of consciousness. The difficulties that destroyed introspectionism at the
turn of the century (Güzeldere 1995) stemmed from its trying to map the
contents of consciousness like entomologists trying to identify every species
of insect. By now, however, it is crystal clear, if it wasn't then, that the
contents of consciousness are unlimited, created as they are by the
interaction of environment, psychophysiological structures,
conceptualization, and reflective awareness. In short, the introspective
project of mapping all possible conscious states is even worse that trying to
identify all insect species; it is more like a cartographer trying to map all
the constantly shifting grains of sand on earth. Therefore, the more feasible
path for SOC to follow is to search for invariants within consciousness,
three of which are attention, conceptualization, and reflection.
1. Attention
[17] The most obvious form of attention is focusing one's
awareness on some content or another. Thus, with my eyes on this computer
screen, I can focus on the screen or I can turn my attention to the sound of
the car starting up outside my window. Or, I can focus on the color of the
type or on the shape of the letters. Similarly, I can focus on a musical
phrase, on a single note, on pitch, loudness, timbre, etc. This sort of
attention is characteristic of ordinary practical living and science.
Describing our experience in this way is sometimes called phenomenology,
which in this sense is synonymous with description.
[18] On the other hand, I can focus on the process of focusing
itself, reflective attention. Thus, instead of focusing on the screen
before me, I focus on my seeing of the screen. This is not the same as
noticing that my eyes are directed toward the screen, my neck bent toward it,
etc. All those things are contents of various awarenesses I have; focusing on
them would be ordinary attention. Reflective attention shifts my focus from
the content to the seeing itself (n 8).
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------------
Notice that it *shifts* my focus,
it does not withdraw it. I am still aware of the screen, but now at the
periphery. Reflective attention is characteristic of phenomenology in its
technical, philosophical sense, which is how this article uses the term.
2. Conceptualization
[19] Before we claim something about our experience, we must
conceptualize it, since it is the conceptualization of our experience that we
assert when we make a claim. As mentioned above, this does not assume that
experience is a pure given, unadulterated by human categories. Experience and
conceptualization are correlative. Whatever the experience, however complex
and filled with conceptualizations it may be, it must be further
conceptualized before we can claim something about it. Thus, I may
conceptualize a particular rendition of Beethoven's Eroica as dynamic and
claim that it is the most dynamic rendition I have heard. The experience
referred to may itself involve an incredible cluster of conceptualizations
and claims, to which is added the conceptualization of the performance as
more dynamic than any other and the claim that that is so. My experience is
then changed: it is one thing to listen to dynamic music and another to
listen to it while thinking of it as the most dynamic I have ever heard. The
reverse can also occur: I can be initially excited by a hyped-up event and
then come down when I realize the degree to which I was responding to the
hype. In short, experiencing can be constructed or deconstructed.
[20] Like attention, conceptualization can be unreflective or
reflective. The example of conceptualizing Beethoven's Eroica as
dynamic was unreflective. Discussing the experience, making an example of it,
was reflective.
3. Reflection
[21] The self-reflective nature of the phenomenology of
consciousness is found in reflective attention and reflective
conceptualization. I must not just be conscious. I must not just be conscious
of something. I must be conscious of consciousness itself (reflective
attention). Similarly, I must not just think. I must not just think about
something. And I must not just think about my own thinking (meta-theory). I
must be aware of as well as think about my thinking process (phenomenology of
consciousness: reflective attention combined with reflective conceptualization).
4. A Conceptual Map of the
Science of Consciousness
[22] The following map does not intend to be exhaustive, but
identifies the major methodologies of SOC and their interrelationships.
Phenomenology: a reflective study of the conscious processes, states,
or events from which all knowing emerges.
Science: the set of all claims, along with their attendant
methodologies, about the contents of experience. Thus broadly conceived,
science includes ordinary claims, which differ only in degree of sophistication.
Everyday Science: our ordinary, relatively naive way of thinking about our
world. This includes Folk Psychology: our ordinary, relatively naive way of
thinking about our thinking.
Neuroscience: the systematic study of the physical and biological,
especially the neural, contributions to mental operations, both conscious and
unconscious.
Behavioral Science: the systematic study of human behaviors.
Cognitive Science: the systematic study of mental functions, both conscious
and unconscious.
Social Science: the systematic study of human interactions.
SOC is, then, composed of the
phenomenology of consciousness plus the sciences insofar as they tell us
something about consciousness.
[23] The more sophisticated the inquirer, the more aware they
are of their processes of inquiry. Therefore, the more sophisticated the
science, the more phenomenologically grounded, culminating in SOC. At an
elemental level, phenomenology and science can pretty much go their separate
ways. For example, I can know a lot about apples without reflecting on my
consciousness of apples. However, we are at a point in history where the two
are intimately entwined. In physics, quantum mechanics raises the question of
the relationship between observer and observed, an issue even more obvious in
the social sciences. In biotechnology, we are developing the ability to
affect our consciousness in ways we do not yet understand - and not through
mind-altering drugs only, but perhaps more profoundly through genetically
reengineering the ground of our consciousness.
[24] Beyond the yin and yang dance of phenomenology and the
ordinary claims of science lie n-claims and e-claims. They are related to SOC
both causally and epistemologically. They are related causally in
that, for all we know at this stage, an increasingly realized SOC may be used
to induce certain n-claims and e-claims as part of altered states of
consciousness. They are related epistemologically in that an
increasingly realized SOC may enable us indirectly to assess their veridicality.
Consider two hypothetical scenarios.
[25] The first scenario involves my n-claim DO (I dissolved
into oneness with the universe). By definition, an n-claim asserts some sort
of insight into reality, but is not a claim based on experience. Since I am
not basing my assertion on experience, science cannot directly disconfirm it.
That, however, is not the end of the story. Behavioral science can run
me through various assessments to determine if there are independent grounds
for thinking that I am delusional, prone to wishful thinking, prone to
unfounded speculation, or usually realistic in my assertions. The results can
provide some grounds for estimating under which one of those possibilities my
n-claim may fall. *Cognitive Science* can try to determine if n-claims are
inconsistent with what we know about mental functioning, at least compatible
with it, or perhaps even serving some specific function. Neuroscience
may someday identify the brain-site of my n-claim and on that basis draw some
conclusions about its nature. For example, it might find that in spite of my
report that this is truly an n-claim that has no reference to experience, in
fact the neural processes that constitute my n-claim function in a network
that includes experience-related processes, such that it is reasonable to
assume that I am simply not aware of the experiential roots of my claim and
that the alleged n-claim it not really an n-claim at all. On the other hand,
neuroscience may be unable to find any neural site for n-claims, with its
inability of such a nature that suggests that my n-claim is indeed a
conscious event independent of ordinary experience and even of the brain.
Finally, social science may similarly employ its particular expertise to
determine possible sociocultural factors that could explain my n-claim.
[26] The second scenario involves my e-claim DO. By
definition, an e-claim is associated with some experience, but is unclear as
to whether it is purely poetic expression or poetic expression by default, as
the best I could do to articulate my experience. From the viewpoint of SOC, purely
poetic expression is a prolific womb from which many claims can be
delivered. The strength of poetry is its ability to use language to express
an intuition whose constitutive experiences and claims can only be guessed,
since the poet was never aware of them, nor cared to be, in the first place.
Its weakness for SOC purposes is that the precise nature of the embedded
experiences and claims can therefore never be completely articulated. Indeed,
it is questionable whether SOC can really say that any particular
interpretation is part of a poetic expression's meaning, only that the
expression brings to mind this or that experience or claim. Thus, as stated
earlier, the best we can say of DO as purely poetic expression is that my
feeling complete rapport with the universe is one meaning that is consistent
with DO.
[27] On the other hand, it is possible that DO is a poetic
expression by default, that it was simply the best I could do. In that
case, it may be possible to identify whatever claims I originally intended to
make. Perhaps I can upon reflection be certain that I did not mean that the
universe and I are literally one and the same. What then did I mean? Perhaps
it is now clear to me that I meant to say that I felt a complete rapport with
the universe. Or perhaps I still can't say just what I meant, in which case
the best we can do may be to treat DO as purely poetic expression and limit
ourselves to articulating possible meanings that are consistent with it.
5. Altered States of
Consciousness
[28] I'm contrasting altered states of consciousness
(hereafter, ACS) with normal or ordinary states (hereafter, OCS) in a
descriptive sense only: the latter are normal only in being the most usual;
nothing is assumed ahead of time as to the relative superiority of one state
over another. Thus, ordinary waking is OCS, whereas dreaming and DO are ACS. Ontologically,
SOC inquires as to the nature, cause, and effects of ACS. Epistemologically,
SOC inquires as to their veridicality, and must do so in a way that begs no
questions, as we have already seen with regard to n-claims. The challenge to
SOC is that ACS may involve experiences inaccessible to OCS, not only in that
the researcher in OCS may not have the experience and therefore have no
1st-person empathy for it, but those who are in ACS may be unable to convey
the nature of their experience in language that is intelligible to the
researcher in OCS. The even greater challenge is that ACS may involve special
knowledge that is inaccessible to OCS.
[29] In other words, state-specific sciences (hereafter, SSS)
may be possible (Tart 1972), sciences with both experiences and methodologies
peculiar to particular conscious states (hereafter, CS). From this
perspective, SOC is a SSS peculiar to OCS. In his article, Tart was intent on
expanding the notion of empirical science so that it included ACS experiences
and methodologies. He never entertained the possibility of n-claims or
knowledge not based on experience of any kind. But just as Tart correctly
argues that we cannot arbitrarily restrict science to OCS, so too do I take
that logic to its limit and argue that we cannot arbitrarily restrict
knowledge to claims based on experience.
[30] Does this open the door to irrationalism? Not at all.
Researchers in OCS are not reduced to helplessly wringing their hands while
alleged ACS gurus seemingly jabber on. We have already seen there are
indirect, but non-question-begging ways, to evaluate n-claims and e-claims
made from within OCS. In principle, we can extend these methods to claims of
any kind made from within ACS. However, we cannot know a priori the extent to
which we will come to satisfactory conclusions. There may be instances where,
unless we get in it ourselves, we will simply not know what to make of a
particular CS and the claims made about it. Of course, this leaves the door
slightly ajar for the irrationalist to operate with impunity. But we cannot
anticipate closing the door completely, unless we are dogmatic empiricists
who insist that no dogmatism but ours is to be countenanced.
[31] My own bias is that there is nothing to be learned from
n-claims, that all knowledge is about experience of some sort. However, SOC
above all sciences cannot foreclose this possibility at the outset. For being
concerned with consciousness itself, SOC must be open not only to its
assumptions, but also to its possible experiences, one of which is knowledge
that is not experience-based. My further bias is that there are no SSS other
than SOC, which is why I made this article about the SOC, rather than a SOC.
Nevertheless, SOC above all sciences cannot foreclose this possibility at the
outset.
[32] Anchored as it is in phenomenology, SOC must be aware not
only of its assumptions, but of the consciousness from which all assumptions
arise. Such awareness takes the SOC researcher beyond critically knowing that
all claims rest on assumptions, to dynamically experiencing the difference
between consciousness itself and the process of making assumptions. In its
furthest reaches, SOC takes us beyond an analytical understanding of
knowledge - a theory about thinking - to a richer experience of our own
consciousness of which thinking and doing is only a part. In other words, SOC
ultimately transforms us so that we experience our environment and ourselves
differently, no longer identified with and clinging to the particular ways in
which we think and act.
6. Objectivity
[33] Because objectivity is so often identified with the 3rd-person
perspective, we must be very clear what sort of objectivity is required and
possible in the 1st-person phenomenology of SOC. We can take our cue from
3rd-person claims, since we have seen that they are built on 1st-person
experience. Few seriously hold that absolute objectivity is possible.
Instead, most reflective writers today hold a position on objectivity that is
roughly like this. We have objective knowledge when certain conditions of
observation are satisfied. Anyone meeting those conditions will make the same
claims that we do. Thus, you and I can agree that this type is black even
though I am listening to the hum of my computer and you are listening to
voices in the background. The relevant conditions have nothing to do with our
hearing, but are that your and my seeing apparatuses are functional and that
there is sufficient light for each of us. In short, objective knowledge is relative
to the conditions of observation, but objective in that when those conditions
are met we can agree on certain claims. Our knowledge is not only objective,
but critical, when we not only satisfy the conditions of observation
but know what they are. Thus, naive subjects in normal conditions can have
objective knowledge of apples, but only reflective subjects who know what
those normal conditions are have critical objective knowledge. That is, their
claims not only happen to be correct, but their knowledge of the
conditions that enable those claims to be made correctly enable them to
assess the likelihood that those claims are indeed true.
[34] Applying this principle to (1st-person) phenomenology is
straightforward though more subtle. Since claims are built on experience, the
conditions that enable them to be made are never exclusively 3rd-person. Certain
conditions within consciousness itself (1st-person conditions) must also
obtain. Thus, in the example just above, not only must your and my seeing
apparatuses be functional and there be sufficient light for each of us
(3rd-person conditions); we must each be paying sufficient attention to, and
thinking clearly about, what is before our eyes (two 1st-person conditions).
In other words, the first two invariants of consciousness, attention and
conceptualization, must be operative. In our unreflective consciousness, we
trust they are operating adequately, since we usually get things right.
However, in cases of uncertainty we resort to reflection, the third invariant
of consciousness, to check whether the necessary conditions (1st-person as
well as 3rd-person) for objective knowledge are truly met. Of course, this
opens up a house of mirrors, since we can ask if our reflection is adequate,
and thus reflect on our reflection. Logically, this can go on forever.
Personally, however, I find that I can only go to two levels; that is, I can
only reflect on my reflection; after that, it is only words. Scientifically,
we can determine how far humans can actually go. In any case, there is no
epistemological stopping point at which we can be assured that the conditions
for objective knowledge have been satisfied. Reflection only reduces the
possibility of error, never eliminates it.
[35] The preceding reveals why it is a mistake to confuse
objectivity with non-belief or non-participation, as in arguing that
researchers cannot be objective students of a religion they believe in, or of
their own culture, with the absurd conclusion that only non-believers can
really know about religion or non-participants can really know about a
group's culture. Objectivity depends on conditions being satisfied such that
correct claims can be made. Researchers who are believers and participants in
the group they are studying can determine as well as anyone else whether
3rd-person conditions are satisfied. Of course, they are biased in their
examination of those conditions; but non-believers and non-participants are
not unbiased, only biased in different ways. The fact that they are all
biased, whether in the group or out, does not condemn them to wanton
subjectiveness. Through their interaction, and through each researcher's
reflection on their own inquiry, they can reduce bias.
[36] The error that objectivity requires non-belief and
non-participation stems from the notion of an objectivity which is exclusive
of subjectivity, of an objectivity which excludes the activity of the
inquiring subject. This is a psychological illusion, because knowledge does
not occur independently of knowing subjects. It is also an epistemological
illusion, because it unrealistically demands that objectivity be free of all possibility
of error. This was Descartes' mistake, not that he began with consciousness,
for where else can any of us begin, but that he sought a foundation free of
all doubt. In contrast, the human fact is that we generally get our claims
right, at least enough of them that the human race has survived and in some
ways progressed up to this point. We do not require infallibility, only
sufficient correctness to keep the system going. We achieve this correctness
on two levels: naively, we are constructed in relation to our environment
such that the conditions are sufficiently met for making correct claims;
reflectively, we become aware of those conditions and improve our
performance, reducing our errors and learning more.
7. The Skills of the Scientist
of Consciousness
[37] Scientists of consciousness will have to have the skills
of their particular specialty. Since the skills required of behavioral,
cognitive, neural, and social scientists are relatively straightforward
(being involved in the "easy" problem), I'll dwell only on the
phenomenological skills required of SOC: attentional, conceptual, and
reflective.
[38] *Attentionally*, scientists of consciousness cannot
remain satisfied with a scientific study of processes, states, or events that
is limited to 3rd-person claims, even if those claims can explain how
consciousness arises. For we have seen that those claims are based on
1st-person experience, so that a fully critical, a fully reflective - indeed,
a fully conscious - SOC must understand the structure of experience in order
to understand fully the nature of any claim made about consciousness. Since
an understanding of experience requires a reflective experiencing of
experience, scientists of consciousness must have the skills required for
r-attention, which must extend from OCS to ACS (n 9).
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[39] Conceptually, scientists of consciousness must
understand (r-conceptualize) the difference between experience and knowledge,
between what is presented and what is claimed about it. This involves understanding
the tricky contrast between the subjective and the objective, which derives
from classical errors of perception. Thus, I see a stick partly immersed in
water as bent and discover on pulling it out of the water that it is really
straight. I conclude that the bent stick is "merely my subjective
impression," whereas in fact the stick is "objectively
straight." The traditional model (OM = objectivity model) that accounts
for this supposes we correct our errors by measuring our subjective
impressions against objective reality. The problem, of course, is that doing
that is a subjective activity, and activity of the experiencing subject. One
response has gravitated to SM (a subjectivity model), arguing that
subjectivity is prior to objectivity. We begin with our own subjective
impressions. The problem here has been that there is no logical necessity
that subjective impressions have to be caused by an objective reality. This
competition has led to the impasse that OM is unable to explain adequately
how we correct error, while SM is unable to explain adequately our
ineradicable belief in an independently existing reality that acts as a
constraint on our beliefs.
[40] The resolution to this dilemma is DM (a dialectical
model, or model of self-correcting rational processes). According to DM, the
original subjective perception of the bent stick is corrected by both
previous and subsequent subjective impressions of the straight stick when out
of water, a correction reinforced by a theory of light refraction, which
itself is developed on the basis of a whole complex of subjective
experiences by the community of physicists. From this perspective,
objectivity is found not in a reality outside the subjective, but in a
self-correcting process within consciousness. For it is within
consciousness itself that I experience the world as a constraint on my
beliefs, such that those beliefs are correct when they "match" the
world and false when they do not. It is within consciousness that I find
others who aid me in finding out facts about the world. And it is within
consciousness that I identify conditions of logic and of observation under
which it is likely that others will make the same claims as I do. It is a
further question whether that world, including other subjects, is a product
of my unconscious mind or exists independently of me. As we have seen in
section 6. Objectivity, an independently existing world is an
ontological hypothesis to account for my subjective experiencing. Again, the
final judge here is pragmatism, not formal logic. Rational inquiry cannot
lift itself by its own bootstraps and ensure its success. We follow it and
improve upon it because it supports practical, daily living and what
scientific progress we have achieved. And again, there has been found no one
who denies an independently existing world who has actually based their
action and thinking on the dictates of that denial.
[41] In sum, in OM 'subjective' is pejorative in that its role
is simply to be lectured to by objective reality; in SM, 'subjective' is
fundamental, but at the expense of independently existing reality; in DM,
although some subjective perceptions are wrong, it is only other subjective
processes that reveal error and correct it - that is, the final judge of
truth is unavoidably subjective judgment, always fallible but also always
capable of reducing error by the self-correcting process of pragmatically
rational (not rationalistic) inquiry.
[42] Reflectively, scientists of consciousness must do
more than believe the preceding theory as a hypothesis. They must confirm it
from within their own reflective self-awareness. For there are at least four
ways they might adopt DM. The first is to employ DM as a useful model. The
second is to believe it is true, because others believe it. The third is to
believe it is true, because their own reflective conceptualization tells them
it is more feasible that its competitors. The fourth is to reflect on their
own conscious inquiring and see for themselves whether they have any
epistemological rock on which they can stand with absolute sureness; whether
or not all their thinking emerges from an undefined, unlimited source within
their own consciousness; and whether or not their personal world is an
essentially temporary structure constructed by their own minds out of the
materials given them in an independently existing reality. Therefore, at the
heart of their inquiry is a practical wisdom by which they decide the
feasibility of holding their current beliefs or inquiring further, given the
resources - material, human, and personal - that are available. In other
words, at the core of inquiry, the science and the applied technology of
consciousness merge - or, more accurately, dialectically embrace. The
scientist and the philosopher become one.
IV. The Applied Technology of
Consciousness (TOC)
[43] Perhaps more than any other science, SOC is driven by
technology or application. The gulf in motivation between the theoretical and
the applied mathematician, and the theoretical physicist and the engineer, is
wide indeed. Even the behavioral scientist might be fascinated to understand
human behavior without necessarily wishing to apply it. However, since it is
within consciousness itself that we experience the felt quality of our lives,
it is unlikely that our motivations for understanding it and for using it to
enhance our quality of life are ever dynamically very far apart, though they
are conceptually distinct. SOC and TOC are intertwined in at least three
ways:, in the practice of concentration, in the practice of mindfulness, and
in answering questions at the heart of human existence.
1. The Practice of
Concentration
[44] In meditation practices, concentration develops our
ability to choose that to which we give our attention. Typically, meditation
practices direct our attention to sense objects - for example, the feeling of
breath on our upper lip or visual focus on a mandala or visual design. Though
the goal of these practices is usually to quiet one's experiencing or prepare
for mindfulness (see below), they might also be employed to help a researcher
develop more control in detailed sense observation. Similarly, this control
of attention could be extended to conceptualizing, to reduce distractions and
clarify thinking. Finally, this control could be extended to consciousness
itself, to make the conscious activity of the researcher more mindful.
2. The Practice of Mindfulness
[45] Unlike concentration, which is concerned with developing
control, mindfulness is concerned with liberation, with freedom from control.
It is therefore initially paradoxical that concentration is often practiced
as a preparation for developing mindfulness. Yet the paradox disappears once
we understand that mindfulness involves a letting go that in effect is a
deeper form of control. (Those who lose their life will find it. No ego, no
problem.) To begin with, concentration and mindfulness both work to overcome
reactive experiencing, in which the subject is the passive recipient of
whatever comes to mind. With concentration, the subject brings their
experiencing under some degree of voluntary control. Formal concentration
practices are often required, but may not always be necessary, to exercise
such control. That is why concentration is often, but not necessarily, practiced
before mindfulness is practiced. In any case, with sufficient voluntary
control the subject can begin to be mindful, to not concentrate on any
particular thing, but just to notice what experiencing involves. Mindfulness,
then, lets go of concentration in order to become reflectively aware of just
what experiencing is really like. This also undermines reactive experiencing,
since the latter's compulsive and clinging character stems from the subject's
being unaware of the experiencing itself.
[46] For example, suppose that I am angry because of something
you said. If I am unaware of my own experiencing, and therefore unmindful of
my own contribution to my anger, I will probably focus on my experience
rather than my experiencing and feel simply that "you made me
angry." On the other hand, if I am mindful of my experiencing, and
therefore aware of my own contribution to my anger, I will probably focus on
my experiencing and be aware that I am responding angrily to what you said. I
am then free to be further mindful of my response and evaluate it
experientially as clinging or not and intellectually as justified or
unjustified. If I am aware of it as a clinging, reactive response, I may be
able to let go of it, in which case the anger may disappear. On the other hand,
it may emerge as a non-reactive expression of something deeper in me. In that
case, my intellectual evaluation becomes appropriate. I may determine that
the anger is justified and be able to act constructively on my righteous
anger; or I may decide the anger is unjustified and thus allow it to wither
away. Notice that it will wither away. It is only reactive, clinging anger
that remains stuck in consciousness even when the subject believes it is
unjustified.
[47] If I wish, I can carry this process to the point of
letting go of particular experiences to such an extent that my focus shifts
to consciousness itself. Just as I can focus on a single letter of this
paragraph so that the rest of the letters on the screen are at the periphery
of my awareness, so I can focus on consciousness itself so that the contents
and structure of that consciousness are at the periphery of my awareness.
This is what I take some mystics to mean when they refer to pure
consciousness, which explains in what sense we can speak of consciousness
which is not consciousness of something (n 10).
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[48] Mindfulness serves SOC by providing a lived confirmation
of the critical theory of inquiry articulated in this article. However, this
does not mean that mindfulness is a substitute for theory. Mindfulness makes
us aware, as it were, of the womb from which all our consciousness arises. It
is an epistemological issue, toward which mindfulness is neutral, whether
from that womb there ever arise either ACS or n-claims that provide special
insight into reality which is not available to OCS and our ordinary practical
and scientific methods, and which can provide a rock-solid ground for a
particular religion, ethics, or ontology. Any such special insight must
compete with a naturalistic pragmatism in just those ways indicated in
section II.2. Non-naturalistic Claims. Mindfulness, however, by
reducing our identification with, and clinging to, any particular viewpoint,
enables us to employ the appropriate epistemological methods to optimally
assess the validity of any claim. In other words, mindfulness allows all the
resources of consciousness to be available for whatever the task at hand may
be; it does not perform the task itself.
3. Wisdom
[49] Wisdom, at least the wisdom of which I am aware or the
wisdom that, extrapolating from my current understanding I can reasonably
believe in, is not omniscience. Nor is it special knowledge. It is what in
sports is called playing within one's abilities, acting appropriately to
circumstances and one's own resources, not trying to be something one is not.
In other words, it is mindfulness of one's own experiencing, letting go of
clinging, defensive reactions that constrict one's own inner resources. By
identifying the neurological, behavioral, cognitive, and social roots of consciousness,
SOC helps us understand the roots of those clinging, defensive reactions. By
applying that knowledge, TOC helps us transform ourselves into conscious
subjects living from deep within ourselves.
[50] We have seen that we cannot decide ahead of time whether
ACS and SSS will add anything to neurological, behavioral, cognitive, and
social sciences. Even if they do, however, it is crucial to understand that,
like those sciences, they are peripheral to wisdom no matter how exotic they
may be. Every spiritual tradition emphasizes that "special gifts,"
depending on whether they are used wisely or reactively, can either enhance
or detract from the essential goal, which is a liberating wisdom. Only this
radical wisdom is incapable of being adulterated, since it is beyond clinging
and emerges only to the extent that clinging is eradicated.
References
Author
Gary Schouborg, Ph.D.,
Philosophical Psychology, is partner of GaryNini.com, Life and Communication
coaches. He has published in philosophy, religious studies, poetry, and
business. Walnut Creek, CA.
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